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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
Petition of Uniformed Firefighters 
Association of Greater New York to 
Review Decision No. B-4-89 and CASE NO. N-0003 
Decision No. B-ll-89 of the Board 
of ^Collective Bargaining ofthe 
City of New York. 
COHEN, WEISS AND SIMON, ESQS. (MICHAEL E. ABRAM, 
ESQ. AND CHRISTOPHER N. SOURIS, ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Petitioner, Uniformed Firefighters Association 
of Greater New York 
FRANCES MILBERG, ESQ., Deputy Director and General 
Counsel, Office of Municipal Labor Relations of the 
City of New York, for Respondent, City of New York 
BOARD DECISION AND ACTION 
Pursuant to the provisions of §205.5(d) of the Civil 
Service Law (hereinafter "CSL"), the Uniformed Firefighters 
Association of Greater New York (hereinafter "UFA") has filed 
a petition, dated April 14, 1989, requesting this Board to 
review two decisions of the Board of Collective Bargaining of 
the City of New York (hereinafter "BCB") dated, respectively, 
February 24, 1989 and March 30, 1989 (Decision No. B-4-89 and 
Decision No. B-ll-89 issued in Docket No. BCB-1117-88 
(1-193-88)). Both decisions dealt with petitions filed by 
UFA and the City of New York seeking a determination as to 
whether certain demands raised during negotiations between 
the parties were mandatory subjects of bargaining within the 
Board - N-0003 
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meaning of §12-307 (formerly §1173-4.3) of the New York City 
Collective Bargaining Law. A previous petition, dated 
March 14, 1989, filed by UFA seeking review of the BCB's 
February 24, 1989 decision, has been withdrawn by UFA. 
A threshold jurisdictional question is presented--"by ~ 
UFA'S petition. The Office of Municipal Labor Relations of 
the City of New York urges that we do not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the petition since the BCB decisions sought 
to be reviewed were not issued in an improper practice 
proceeding. 
CSL §2 05.5(d) reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
The board shall exercise exclusive 
nondelegable jurisdiction of the powers 
granted to it by this paragraph; 
provided, however, that this sentence 
shall not apply to the city of New York. 
The board of collective bargaining 
established by section eleven hundred 
seventy-one of the New York city charter 
shall establish procedures for the 
prevention of improper employer and 
employee organization practices as 
provided in section 1173-4.2 of the 
administrative code of the city of New 
York, provided, however, that a party 
aggrieved by a final order issued by the 
board of collective bargaining in an 
improper practice proceeding may, within 
ten days after service of the final 
order, petition the board for review 
thereof. Within twenty days thereafter, 
the board, in its discretion, may assert 
jurisdiction to review such final order. 
Clearly, the statute authorizes this Board's review only 
of BCB decisions issued in improper practice proceedings 
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authorized by former §1173-4.2 (now §12-306) .-3=/ The question 
is presented whether proceedings leading to scope of 
bargaining determinations rendered by the BCB pursuant to the 
provisions of former §1173-4.3 of the Administrative Code of 
the :City of~ New~ Y b r ^ 
improper practice proceedings within the intent of CSL 
§205.5(d). We conclude that they are not and that CSL 
§2 05.5(d) does not authorize review by us of scope of 
bargaining determinations made by the BCB pursuant to 
§1173-4.3 of the Code. 
Section 1173-4.2 of the Code—the only section specified 
in CSL §2 05.5(d)—defines prohibited improper employer and 
employee organization practices in a manner substantively 
consistent with CSL §209-a. (Organization of Staff Analystsr 
18 PERB ?[3067 (1985).) Section 1173-4.3 of the Code, 
however, defines the scope of collective bargaining, 
including a specification of management rights. The Rules of 
the Office of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York 
(hereinafter "OCB") deal separately with a petition alleging 
an improper practice in violation of §1173-4.2 (OCB Rules 
§7.4) and a petition seeking a determination with regard to a 
dispute over the scope of collective bargaining under 
§1173-4.3 (OCB Rules §7.3). The final order in the latter 
l/lnasmuch as CSL §205.5(d) refers to the former enumeration, 
we shall, for the purposes of this decision, use that 
enumeration. 
Board - N-0003 -4 
proceeding is a determination in the nature of a declaratory 
ruling with no remedial order.-2/ This separation of improper 
practice and scope of bargaining proceedings existed under 
the Code prior to the enactment of the review provisions of 
-e-S"-L--§"-2-"G"5""i--5-"("d:)-v^/--"" We conclude- that specific reference in CSIy 
§205.5(d) to proceedings under §1173-4.2 was deliberate and 
was not intended to authorize our review of scope of 
bargaining proceedings under §1173-4.3. 
Our decision in Organization of Staff Analysts, suprar 
does not require a different result. There, we asserted 
jurisdiction to review a BCB decision issued in an improper 
practice proceeding and held that the proper standard of 
review is substantive consistency between BCB and PERB 
decisions in improper practice cases. It is evident that the 
Legislature, in amending §205.5(d) to provide for our review 
only of BCB improper practice decisions, did not mandate 
substantive consistency between BCB and PERB decisions in 
scope of bargaining cases. This legislative judgment is 
consistent with our decision in City of New York (PBA), 
9 PERB ^3 031 (1976), rendered prior to the 1978 enactment of 
the review provisions of CSL §205.5(d), at a time when that 
statute granted exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction to this 
Board over improper practices by the City of New York. In 
1/it may be noted that we have recently adopted a declaratory 
ruling procedure for scope of negotiation disputes as an 
alternative to the improper practice proceeding. 
3/Laws of 1978, C. 291. 
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that decision, we held that while we had jurisdiction over an 
improper practice charge that raised scope of bargaining 
issues, we would nevertheless accept prior BCB scope of 
bargaining decisions even if they might differ from our own. 
InT reaching this ""conclusion"/ we relied, among otEer reasons, 
upon the unique status granted to OCB under CSL §212, the 
unique negotiating problems confronting New York City and the 
expertise of OCB in dealing with such problems. These 
reasons continue to warrant leaving scope of bargaining 
determinations to the judgment of the BCB. 
ACTION TAKEN: Jurisdiction refused. 
DATED: May 8, 1989 
Albany, New York 
, Chairman » Harold R. Newman 
uU44Az.Z?r^* 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//2B-5/8/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOSEPH WERNER, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9182 
MIDDLE COUNTRY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
JOSEPH WERNER, pro se 
JAMES R. SANDNER, ESQ. (J. CHRISTOPHER MEAGHER, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Middle Country Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFL-CIO 
(Association) excepts to two aspects of a remedial order issued 
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in connection with a 
decision on a charge brought by Joseph Werner (Werner) holding 
that the Association violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to place in 
escrow (or segregate by some other method, such as a "cushion" 
payment) funds reasonably in dispute under the Association's 
1986-87 agency shop refund procedure. The Association's 
exceptions do not contest the finding of a violation, but 
challenge the ALJ's recommended order to refund to Werner his 
entire agency shop fee for 1986-87 and to mail notice of the 
ALJ's decision and recommended order to the last known residence 
of all unit employees. 
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The Association argues first that the requirement that an 
escrow account be established for agency fees reasonably in 
dispute was first established in March 198 6 by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 19 PERB 
57502 •- (1:9 8 6 ) , after v the Ass delation "es talal ishedzxt sT 19 S^ - 87" ^ : " 
agency shop fee refund procedure. However, the Hudson decision 
predated the Association's implementation of its advance 
reduction and collection procedures for the 1986-87 fiscal year, 
and no claim is made that, as required by Hudson, the fees in 
dispute could not have been placed in escrow when collected. 
Thus, and consistent with our conclusion in other cases-^/ where 
an agency fee refund procedure fails to meet the minimum 
requirements of §208.3(b) of the Act, refund of the agency fees 
collected for the at-issue fiscal year will be ordered, in 
keeping with our powers of equity relief under §2 05.5(d) of the 
Act. The Association's first exception is denied. 
Turning to the second Association exception, it is our 
determination, consistent with our previous holding in Middle 
Country Teachers Association (Werner and Verdon)r supra, that, as 
asserted by the Association, the mailing of a notice to all 
bargaining unit members is not warranted by the circumstances of 
this case. We there held that a direct mailing of the required 
1/see, e.g., UUP (Barry, Eson and Gallup), 20 PERB 53039 (1987), 
conf'd in part and remanded in part, UUP v. Newman A.D.2d 
, 22 PERB 57012 (April 27, 1989); Middle Country Teachers 
Association (Werner and Verdon) , 22 PERB 53004 (1989) . 
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notice to all bargaining unit members was not necessary in order 
to address the problem of agency fee payers not receiving actual 
notice of this Board's findings because of the likelihood that 
agency fee payers would not read employee organization bulletin 
boards, where sucfrh^ 
addressed there, and is addressed here, by directing the posting 
of the required notice in the customary manner and by directing 
the inclusion of the notice prominently in the next available 
issue of the Association's newspaper, if the Association issues a 
newspaper directly to all bargaining unit members. If it does 
not, the Association is directed to both post the required notice 
and mail it to all agency fee payers identified in the payroll 
deduction list immediately preceding such mailing. 
Except as so modified, the ALJ* decision is affirmed. 
Accordingly, the Association IS HEREBY ORDERED to: 
1. Refund forthwith to Werner the total amount of agency 
fees deducted from his salary for the 1986-87 fiscal 
year, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
2. Amend its agency fee refund procedure, for 1986-87 and 
future fiscal years, to provide for placing the amount 
of agency fees reasonably in dispute in an interest 
bearing escrow account while challenges are pending, or 
for the addition of a 10% cushion to the advance 
reduction payment. 
3. Post forthwith the attached notice at all work 
locations ordinarily used by the Association to 
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communicate information to bargaining unit employees. 
4. Include such notice prominently in the next available 
issue of an Association newspaper which is distributed 
directly to all bargaining unit members, or, in the 
alternative, mail the "attachedJV-n6txce"""tb--rth-e~"l^ :s^ --knT6wn-""" 
residence address of all agency fee payers in the 
Association unit, based upon the most recent payroll 
deduction list prior to such mailing. 
DATED: May 8, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMRUOYMENTDELATIONS.BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Middle 
Country Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFL-CIO (Association) that 
the Association will: 
lo Refund forthwith to Joseph Werner the total amount 
of agency fees deducted from his salary for the 
1986-87 fiscal year, with interest at the maximum 
\ •legal rate, 
2. Amend its agency fee refund procedure, for 1986-87 
and future fiscal years, to provide for placing the 
amount of agency fees reasonably in dispute in an 
interest bearing escrow account while challenges 
are pending, or for the addition of a 10% cushion 
to the advance reduction payment„ 




This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#20-5/8/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF MAMARONECK, 
Charging Party, 
-and- " CASENO. U-10138 
VILLAGE OF MAMARONECK POLICE 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C. (TERENCE M. O'NEIL, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
KRUSE & McNAMARA, ESQS. (RAYMOND G. KRUSE, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of both the 
Village of Mamaroneck (Village) and the Village of Mamaroneck 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to an Administrative Law 
Judge (AKJ) decision which found that the PBA violated §2 09-
a.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
submitting certain nonmandatory subjects of negotiation to 
compulsory interest arbitration, and which dismissed the 
remainder of the Village's charge. The charge filed by the 
Village alleges, first, that the PBA improperly submitted to 
the interest arbitration panel a demand that Article XIII(D) 
of the parties' expired collective bargaining agreement be 
continued. That Article provides for continuation of the 
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same medical insurance coverage for retirees and their 
families as is provided to members of the Village's Police 
Department and their families. Second, the charge alleges 
that the PBA has improperly pursued to interest arbitration 
"numerousr demands which make referenceto:OT:iod:ify::sections: 
of the expired collective bargaining agreement, at Articles 
IX(B), X(C), XI, XIII(D), XIV(E), XV(A) and (B [1,2,3]) and 
add a new unnumbered article. The Village asserts that each 
of these PBA proposals is a nonmandatory subject of 
bargaining. 
AKJ DECISION 
During the course of the proceeding before the ALJ, the 
PBA withdrew its demands concerning Articles XI, XIV(E) and 
the new unnumbered article. The Village, accordingly, 
withdrew so much of its charge as alleged violations of the 
Act with respect to those articles, and they are not now 
before us. 
The PBA also withdrew its demands concerning Articles 
IX(B) and XIII(D). However, the PBA made the assertion 
during the proceedings before the ALJ that, in its opinion, 
withdrawal of these demands from interest arbitration would 
result in their continuing in effect following issuance of 
the interest arbitration award. The PBA argued that the 
expired agreement continues in effect except insofar as it is 
modified by negotiations or by an arbitration award which 
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resolves those issues submitted by the parties to the 
arbitration panel. In view of these assertions to the ALJ, 
the Village refused to withdraw the portions of its charge 
which allege violations of the Act by the PBA in connection 
with Articles TXfBj and XIII{D)v 
Notwithstanding the Village's refusal to withdraw these 
aspects of its charge, the ALJ dismissed a portion of the 
charge upon the ground that the PBA no longer insists upon 
submission of Articles IX(B) and XIII(D) to interest 
arbitration. 
As to Article X(C), which relates to an election by 
employees of compensatory time off in lieu of overtime 
compensation, the ALJ found the demand to be nonmandatory. 
He did so on the basis of a finding that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act requires that compensatory time off be utilized 
within the pay period it was earned and that the election of 
compensatory time off, unfettered by any management control, 
could accordingly affect staffing levels and the ability of 
the Village to deliver its services. 
As to Article XV(A), which seeks to set a maximum number 
of days employees will be required to work during the work 
year, together with a tour of duty consisting of four days on 
followed by three days off duty, the ALJ found the demand to 
be mandatorily negotiable. 
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Articles XV(B)[1],[2] and [3] require the Village to 
assign specific officers to fill vacancies caused by the 
absence of superior officers, and to pay employees so 
assigned premium pay for out-of-title work. The ALJ found 
that although" the -latter aspect: of - the (i^aM is laMatoril7J; 
negotiable, the former is not. Treating the demands as a 
single unitary demand, the ALJ concluded that the existence 
of nonmandatory material in the demand renders the entire 
demand a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Articles IXfB) and XIII(D) 
The Village contends that, notwithstanding the PBA's 
J withdrawal of these demands from interest arbitration, the 
PBA is engaged in improper insistence upon negotiation of 
these articles because it takes the position that the terms 
of the expired agreement continue in effect unless modified 
by the parties' agreement or by the interest arbitration 
award. 1/ At the outset, we note that the Village's charge is 
limited to the allegation that the PBA "has insisted in 
interest arbitration" on inclusion of these items in the 
arbitration award and/or a successor agreement. The ALJ 
found, however, and we agree, that the PBA is not now 
i/The PBA's petition for interest arbitration does not seek 
as a demand to be decided by the panel the continuation of 
all terms of the parties * expired agreement not modified by 
agreement or award. 
) 
) 
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insisting upon submission of these items to interest 
arbitration. The PBA also is not insisting upon further 
negotiation of these items. Rather, its position is that, 
unless affirmatively negotiated out of the expired agreement, 
or unless modified by ah interest arbitration" awar^ as ^ r 
result of submission of proposed modifications to the panel, 
the terms of the expired agreement continue in effect by 
operation of law. It is this legal argument to which the 
Village objects and concerning which it now seeks a 
determination. 
In the context of this case, the request for a 
determination concerning the merit of the PBA's legal 
argument which constitutes its motivation for withdrawal of 
demands alleged in the Village's charge to be nonmandatory 
subjects of bargaining is not an appropriate part of the 
matter before us. Notwithstanding its argument, the record 
does not establish that the PBA is now pursuing to interest 
arbitration or insisting upon negotiating nonmandatory 
subjects of bargaining as the charge alleges. The fact that 
the PBA presents an argument concerning the effect of a 
failure to negotiate or modify an expired agreement 
(primarily relying upon §209-a.l(e) of the Act), does not 
give rise to a cognizable charge under §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act. We, accordingly, do not reach the question of the 
Board - U-10138 
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status of items in an expired agreement which have not been 
affirmatively renegotiated or modified. 
We find, however, that the parties are entitled to a 
determination concerning whether these two articles 
constitute mandatory or nonmandatorysubjects of- -
bargaining.-2A PBA's Article IX(B) would provide that 
"Vacations shall be spread from January 1 through 
December 31." The Village argues that this demand is 
nonmandatory because it could be construed to limit the 
discretion of management to determine its manpower needs and 
staff deployment, "essentially stating on its face that any 
police officer may take a vacation at any time" (Village 
brief, p. 21). We do not construe the demand so broadly, and 
treat it as a demand that procedures applicable to use of 
vacation time will apply throughout the calendar year, rather 
than be limited to a portion of the calendar year. As such, 
the demand does not constitute an interference with 
management prerogatives, and is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. 
^•/The Village's exceptions include the claim that an ALJ 
finding, in dicta, that Article IX(B) is a mandatory subject 
of bargaining is erroneous, while the PBA's exceptions 
include the claim that the ALJ finding, in dicta, that 
Article XIII(D) is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining is 
erroneous. The fact that the PBA stated, at the pre-hearing 
conference, and thereafter in writing, its intention to 
withdraw these two demands from interest arbitration does not 
serve to moot the issue raised by the Village's charge. See 
City of Schenectady, 21 PERB f3022, at 3045-46 (1988). 
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Article XIII(D) would require the Village to continue to 
make payments for medical insurance premiums on behalf of 
retirees and their families in the same fashion as are made 
on behalf of bargaining unit members and their families. We 
have previously he Id that negotiation1 of health- ^ hsurahce "•"-
benefits for persons who are unit members, but who retire 
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining.-3-/ However, because persons 
who have already retired are not members of a collective 
bargaining unit, an employer may not be compelled to engage 
in negotiations for benefits applicable to them.4/ This PBA 
demand is held to be nonmandatory. 
Article X(C) of the PBA demand eliminates the 
requirement of approval of the Chief of Police before an 
election may be made by a police officer between compensatory 
time off and overtime compensation for overtime work. The 
ALJ found that the Fair Labor Standards Act renders the 
demand nonmandatory, because a requirement contained therein 
that compensatory time be utilized during the pay period 
following which it is earned would limit the Village's 
discretion to maintain staffing levels. As the PBA points 
out, however, the Fair Labor Standards Act now permits the 
•2/sewanaka Central High School District, 17 PERB ?[3 049 
(1984) . 
4/Troy Uniformed Firefighters Association, Local 23 04, IAFFr 
10 PERB 53015 (1977). 
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election of compensatory time off and accumulation for police 
officers of up to 32 0 hours of actual overtime worked, or 480 
hours at the time and one-half rate. (See Fair Labor 
Standards Act, §7(0); 29 CFR 553.21, 553.22). In view of 
this authorization for accumulationof compensatory timey the-"-
issue of election by a bargaining unit member of compensatory 
time off in lieu of overtime compensation is a mandatory 
subject of negotiation. 
Article XV(A) provides as follows: "No member of the 
unit shall be required to work more than 232 days in any 
calendar year. Those employees assigned to rotating shifts 
shall work a 4 and 72 schedule." The AKJ found the demand 
) to be mandatory, notwithstanding the claim made by the 
Village that the limitation of 232 days violates its right to 
determine its manpower and staff deployment needs. As we 
have previously held, however, in Town of Blooming Grove, 21 
PERB K3032, at 3069 (1988), while "the right of the Town to 
establish its manpower needs by establishing levels of 
coverage for each day of the week constitutes a management 
prerogative about which the Town was not obligated to bargain 
[footnote omitted]", an employer is obligated to negotiate 
the method by which its manpower needs will be met in terms 
of tours of duty. (See also City of White Plains, 5 PERB 
1[3008 (1982); City of Buffalo, 14 PERB ?[3053 (1981).) The 
length of the employees * work year and tours of duty are 
") 
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mandatory subjects of bargaining. The Village's charge is 
accordingly dismissed with respect to Article XV(A). 
Article XV(B) [1, 2, and 3] specifies the subordinate 
officers who will fill vacancies caused by the absence of 
superior officers from duty> dir^ts:tfetrthos&:vacancie& 
will be filled by such subordinate officers, and establishes 
the pay rate at which they shall be paid. As the ALJ found, 
because the demands would compel the Village to fill 
vacancies on a shift, the demands, which are unitary in 
nature, are nonmandatory, notwithstanding the existence of 
some portions which, if separate, would be mandatory. The 
ALJ decision in connection with Article XV(B) [1, 2 and 3] is 
accordingly affirmed. 
Based upon the foregoing, the ALJ decision is affirmed, 
except as modified herein. 
By submitting for interest arbitration demands 
identified as Article XIII(D) and XV(B) [1, 2 and 3], which 
are nonmandatory, the PBA has violated §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act. In all other respects, the Village's charge is 
dismissed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the PBA withdraw those 
demands found herein to be nonmandatory from its petition for 
interest arbitration. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the PBA cease and desist from 
insisting upon further negotiations concerning the demands 
found herein to be nonmandatory. 
DATED: May 8, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Chairman H&rold R. Newman, i 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
#2D-5/8/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STEPHEN NWASOKWA, 
Charging Party, 
—and- --...-. i-CASE - NO^ .---JET^ Q£36 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
CHAPTER 2 CIVIL SERVICE TECHNICAL GUILD, 
LOCAL 375, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondents. 
STEPHEN NWASOKWA, pro se 
ROBERT PEREZ-WILSON, ESQ. (ROSARIO R. ESPERON, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Chapter 2 Civil Service Technical 
Guild, Local 375, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Stephen Nwasokwa excepts to the dismissal of his 
improper practice charge against Chapter 2 Civil Service 
Technical Guild, Local 375, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Local 375), 
which alleges a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Public 
Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) by its failure to 
process a meritorious grievance concerning Nwasokwa's 
termination from employment by his employer, the New York 
City Transit Authority (Authority) .-i/ In particular, 
Nwasokwa alleges that Local 375 breached its duty of fair 
•i/The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissed the 
portion of Nwasokwa's charge which alleged violations of the 
Act by the Authority. That dismissal is not the subject of 
exceptions, and the Authority is not party to the proceedings 
before us. 
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representation when it failed to process a grievance on his 
behalf or otherwise assist him in connection with his 
termination from employment. The ALT found, and the record 
before us clearly establishes, that Melvin Levy, President of 
i::._.- Local: 375/ inv:es:tigated:--the---matter^ .O:f^ :rNwasokwa-ts"^ te-rmdn-ation-,--
and learned that Nwasokwa, a Civil Engineer, had been 
appointed provisionally and accordingly had no disciplinary 
hearing rights upon his termination by the Authority.-2/ The 
ALJ credited Levy's testimony that he informed Nwasokwa of 
the Authority's right to terminate him at will due to his 
provisional status, and that there was no further action 
which Local 375 could take on his behalf in connection with 
his termination. 
Nwasokwa's charge rests upon his claim that his 
appointment to a Civil Engineer position with the Authority 
was not provisional, but was probationary, and that he 
achieved permanent status upon the expiration of a one-year 
probationary period, such that he was in fact entitled to the 
5/The parties' collective bargaining agreement provides that 
disciplinary procedures involving bargaining unit employees 
will be conducted in accordance with §75, Civil Service Law. 
Section 75 disciplinary procedures are available only to 
persons having permanent status. 
^-/Nwasokwa also contends that Local 375 improperly failed 
to assist him in obtaining a cash payment for accumulated 
vacation and sick leave. However, the record establishes 
that Local 375 did in fact assist him in obtaining those 
leave credits to which he was entitled. That aspect of the 
charge was accordingly properly dismissed by the ALJ for the 
reasons set forth in her decision. See 22 PERB 1(4501 (1989) . 
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protections of §75 Civil Service Law. Notwithstanding this 
contention, the record is devoid of evidence to support it. 
For example, there is no evidence that Nwasokwa took or 
passed a civil service examination for the position, that he 
was ^on an eligible-list at: the time oxf li±s appointmentv ox 
that his appointment was from such a list. Indeed, no 
documentary evidence was produced to support the claim of 
probationary or permanent status. The ALJ properly found 
that the investigation conducted by Local 375 into Nwasokwa's 
termination disclosed that he was not entitled to 
disciplinary procedures prior to his termination due to his 
provisional status and that it accordingly properly refused 
to process a grievance which it concluded would have been 
nonmeritorious. 
It is well settled that an employee organization is 
under no duty to process all grievances by bargaining unit 
members, and that it is entitled to a wide range of 
discretion and reasonableness in determining the merit of 
grievances which it will pursue.4/ 
The record amply supports the ALJ's determination that 
Nwasokwa has failed to meet his burden of establishing any breach 
4/citv Employees Union Local 237, 20 PERB 53042 (1987) ; 
Nassau Educational Chapter of the Syosset CSD Unit, CSEA, 
Inc., 11 PERB ^3010 (1978); Scio-Allentown Teachers 
Association, 10 PERB [^3050 (1977) . 
Board - U-9836 -4 
of the duty of fair representation under §209-a.2(a) of the Act 
by Local 375, and the dismissal of the charge is, accordingly, 
affirmed. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. •" • .-.:.-.-:—..•.•:.-
DATED: May 8, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
-t. 
Walter L. Eisenberg , Member 
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INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 
1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) moves for permission to appeal a 
decision on motion issued by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director), which 
directed the consolidation of four-i/ improper practice 
charges (Case Nos. U-9480, U-10257, U-10340 and U-10468) 
filed by CSEA against the County of Nassau (County). Each of 
the charges alleges violations of §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act (Act). In particular, each of 
the charges alleges that the County entered into subcontracts 
I/A fifth charge, U-10133, was not consolidated, and neither 
party has.excepted to that aspect of the Director's decision. 
\ 
Board - U-9480, U-10340, U-10257, U-10468 -2 
with different subcontractors for the performance of 
bargaining unit work in various departments and facilities of 
the County at different points in time and for the 
performance of different services. The County moved to 
consolidate these charges upon the grounds of common parties, 
common legal issues and, in part, common facts, particularly 
with regard to its affirmative defense of contractual waiver. 
Although CSEA concedes that the proof with respect to 
the issue of contractual waiver will be the same for all 
cases, other issues, such as the timeliness of the charges, 
whether the work subcontracted was exclusively unit work, and 
the facts and circumstances surrounding each subcontract are 
dissimilar. It asserts in its motion for permission to 
appeal the Director's decision that review by this Board 
should be had at this time, and that the Director's decision 
to consolidate should be reversed. 
As a general rule, this Board will not review the 
interlocutory determinations of the Director or an 
Administrative Law Judge until such time as all proceedings 
below have been concluded, and review may be had of the 
entire matter. 
2/ 
It is only when extraordinary circumstances 
are present and/or in which severe prejudice would otherwise 
result if interlocutory review were denied that we will 
•2/ See §204.7 (h) of PERB' s Rules of Procedure (Rules) with 
regard to improper practices and §201.9(c)(3) for 
representation matters. 
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entertain a request for such review. See County of Rockland, 
21 PERB ?[3055 (1988) ; State of New York (Division of Military 
and Naval Affairs) , 18 PERB [^3084 (1985) ; Village of Geneseo, 
17 PERB ?[3026 (1984) . 
In this case, it is apparent that if we do not review 
the Director's consolidation of these matters at this time, 
they will proceed to hearing and determination on a 
consolidated basis. If the Director's decision to 
consolidate is erroneous, such a finding after the fact would 
be essentially meaningless. In Business Council of New York 
State, Inc. v. Cooney, 102 A.D.2d 1001 (3d Dep't 1984), the 
Appellate Division considered an interlocutory appeal from 
the denial of a motion to consolidate actions pending in two 
counties. The Court concluded that the interlocutory 
decision denying consolidation was appropriate for appellate 
review and issued a decision on the merits. The same result 
is appropriate here, because review at the conclusion of the 
consolidated proceedings would, if reversal occurred, require 
us to either order no relief or to direct the parties to 
conduct hearings again on a severed basis. Neither of these 
alternatives is acceptable. 
Turning to the merits of the Director's determination, 
we apply the standard of review enunciated by the Court in 
Business Council of New York State, Inc. v. Cooney, supra. 
In that case, the Court stated the principle as follows: 
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It is a general principle that cases 
which involve identical parties and 
issues may be tried together in the sound 
discretion of the court (CPLR 602, 
subd[a]; Siecrel, N.Y. Prac, §§128-129). 
The exercise of that discretion will be 
disturbed only when an appellate court 
finds that it may result in substantial 
prejudice to one or more of the parties. 
^ - ^ 
motion to demonstrate that it would 
prejudice him (Matter of Vicfo S.S. Corp. 
[Marship Corp. of Monrovia1, 26 N.Y.2d 
157, cert den sub nom. Frederick Snare 
Corp. v. Vigo S.S. Corp., 400 U.S. 819). 
102 A.D.2d 1001, 1002. 
It is our determination that the Director did not abuse 
his discretion in determining to consolidate the four pending 
improper practice charges filed by CSEA against the County, 
and that CSEA has not met its burden of establishing 
prejudice to it as a result of consolidation. 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Director 
on motion consolidating these matters for hearing is hereby 
affirmed, and they are remanded to the Director for further 
proceedings not inconsistent herewith. 
DATED: April 26, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe^ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 200B, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NOV G-3498 
NORTH SYRACUSE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
NORTH SYRACUSE FOOD SERVICE ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 200B, SEIU, AFL-CIO has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: All full and part time food service workers, 
including cooks, cook managers, bakers, 
cashiers, dishwashers, line people, and 
drivers. 
Excluded: Supervisors and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 20OB, SEIU, AFL-CIO. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 8, 1989 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UMAZ-2-
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
